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Abstract
Biotechnology, just like other dynamically growing branches
of industry, has been very rapidly changing. Disruptive innova-
tions arise from time to time. Since this is a very high risk – high
benefit industry, and R&D phases often require several hundred
millions of dollars, the participants seek to minimize and share
risk.
In case of biotechnology the assessment of risks (uncertain-
ties) in the technological development is becoming an increas-
ingly difficult task to solve. This is especially true in a rapidly
changing turbulent environment, where environment and its
knowledge changes from day to day, where in addition to small
ones, radical innovations are typical as well. Understanding
the necessary parameters is becoming more and more uncer-
tain, thus also becoming limited. There is a huge literature on
technological uncertainty just as there is on risks of financial
issues.
My main problem with this is that there is a strong inclina-
tion to believe that uncertainty can always be successfully mod-
elled by quantitative risk assessment (qRA). In contrast to this, a
wide range of environmental studies puts emphasis on the non-
predictable risk. (Think of the the management consequence of
non-predictability, the needed precaution.)
A small biotech company has two alternatives for survival:
finding a protected market, where, drawing on resources from
outside, it can become influential, or by concentrating on co-
operation, solving a partial task, working as part of a cluster,
becoming an importer of knowledge.
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1 Introduction
Biotechnology, just like other dynamically growing branches
of industry, has been very rapidly changing. Disruptive innova-
tions arise from time to time. Since this is a very high risk - high
benefit industry, and R&D phases often require several hundred
millions of dollars, the participants seek to minimize and share
risk. A small biotech company has two alternatives for survival:
1 finding a protected market, where, drawing on resources from
outside, it can become influential, or
2 by concentrating on cooperation, solving a partial task, work-
ing as part of a cluster, becoming an importer of knowledge.
2 Biotechnology and the pharmaceutical industry from
a strategic point of view
2.1 Biotechnological innovations and trends
Biotechnology is spreading rapidly in the pharmaceutical, en-
vironmental protection, agricultural, and other industrial envi-
ronments. The number of molecules produced by biotechnolog-
ical methods is growing rapidly, thanks to new methods and an
almost exponentially increasing knowledge base.
The appearance of novelties is very fast. There is a significant
technological leap, from time to time. These radical innovations
are aimed at solving complex problems by implementing and
integrating new technologies [1]. Radical innovations that lead
to disruptive technological development are usually the result
of long term research. These innovations can provide a broad
platform for a new regime in technology [2]. At the same time,
disruptive innovation is not necessarily radical. Small innova-
tions can also have great disruptive economical influence. Just
think about the turning to containers of oversee ship cargos, for
example.
The development of biotechnology can be divided into several
large eras [3]:
• The period started with the conscious use of biotechnology.
This process started in the second half of the 19th century
(about 1865), when Pasteur discovered that fermentation is
caused by microorganisms. After understanding the essence
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Fig. 1. [6]: Ratio of newly registered phramaceu-
ticals:chemical and biotech entities.
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of this process through microbiology, its industrial applica-
tion became feasible. The beer and alcohol industries de-
veloped, vinegar and lactic acid production began. The pro-
duction of ethanol, butanol, acetone, glycerin, citric acid etc.
through fermentation began.
• The discovery of antibiotics provided the momentum for the
second great leap around 1940. The productivity of microor-
ganisms was increased by biological, genetic and biochemical
methods (mutation, selection). Building on these opportuni-
ties and the rapid development of fermentation techniques,
the result was a veritable technological revolution. The most
important results were the large scale production technologies
of antibiotics, amino acids and enzymes.
• The next phase started in the first half of the 1970s. The
essence of this new biotechnology is that altering the herita-
ble material of living beings, through a conscious and planned
manner, results in the development of new characteristics.
Through the use of recombinant DNA and cell fusion, hu-
mans begun to alter the characteristics and functions of living
organisms to suit their needs.
• The fourth era is linked to the first commercial sale of human
insulin (1982). This is the first member of the rDNA pharma-
ceutical products, meaning the large scale distribution of the
products of the previous era. Thus growth gained even more
momentum.
• The fifth era can be marked by the latest great innovation, on
one hand, the cloning of animals by the use of a cell nucleus,
the creation of “Dolly” (1997) and on the other, the comple-
tion of the “Human Genome Project” (2000).
Many people see biotechnology as an industry of decisive strate-
gic importance at the start of the 21st century. According to fore-
casts, by the middle of the next decade, the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries will become the leading branches in
the world, surpassing information technology and telecommu-
nication. In this article I will only concentrate on red (medical)
biotechnology.
The EU considers to develop the biotech industry in view
of the pharmaceutical industry exceptionally important. This
means strengthening collaboration between the two sectors [4].
Biotechnology plays an increasingly important role in pharma-
ceutical development, by preventing the onset of and curing
previously un-curable diseases through the implementation of
new diagnostic methods and treatments. Pharmaceuticals pro-
duced through biotech methods, such as proteins, antibodies,
enzymes comprised 25% of pharmaceutical sales in 2003 [5].
Most of the pharmaceuticals currently undergoing clinical tri-
als are biotechnological in origin. The percentage of pharma-
ceuticals produced using biotechnological methods, is growing
rapidly. Of all registered small molecules, significantly more are
produced by biotechnological methods, than by synthetic meth-
ods (Fig. 1).
These were all changes that radically altered the perspectives
and tasks of biotechnology. Main directions of research were
shifted, and the map of biotechnology was rearranged by eco-
nomic factors as well. Therefore these are definitely disruptive
innovations. Fig. 2 shows biotechnological knowledge, plotted
against a timeline:
Usually, there is a complex, multidimensional, non-linearly
correlated uncertainty surrounding disruptive, especially radical
innovations, the solution of which often requires cross linked
steps. It is important to state, that in terms of management, in
opposition to small innovations, the management of radical in-
novations includes the ability to navigate in sight of unforeseen-
able events [2].
2.2 Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies
Medical biotechnology is used by two main types of compa-
nies. They are either large companies drawing on a long history
in the given field and developing into more and more innova-
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Fig. 2. Changes of the knowledge level in biotech
tive biotechnology users, such as large pharmaceutical compa-
nies (“big pharma”). Or, modern biotechnological companies
emerge, which the previously stated large companies purchase
knowledge, projects or services from. Mainly the large compa-
nies control the biotechnology industry with regard to revenue.
However this does not lead to strict adherence to traditions and
the conservation of states of power. This is because, in terms
of knowledge and the number of innovative projects, altogether
small biotech companies have the comparative advantage.
Many biotech companies were founded in the 70s and 80s.
First they sought to become completely vertically integrated
companies, encompassing everything from R&D to production
and sales. They used closed innovation only. Gradually, these
companies brought new trends in their innovation strategies. At
first the companies lacked two things that kept them from reach-
ing their goals: the lack of funds, and experienced managers.
However these two things are essential (in addition to technol-
ogy) for a company to grow from a spin-off enterprise to a large
pharmaceutical company. The classic pharmaceutical compa-
nies, being on the top that time, already possessed these re-
sources. Thus some of them purchased biotech companies while
others however were not open to biotechnology in terms of in-
vestment and cooperation [7].
The volume and complexity of biotech and pharmaceutical
projects grew in relation to the amount of available information
and acquired knowledge in an environment of steadily growing
needs for new knowledge. This placed further emphasis on co-
operation, the sharing of costs and risks of producing new R&D
results. An industry of high risk benefit type emerged. This led
to problems, but opportunities as well. Concerning the prob-
lems it was asked: Who will finance the costs of research? Will
investors think that the industry is too risky? Naturally the sig-
nificance of professional investors and specific tenders increased
with this.
Companies were forced to cooperate due to the high risk asso-
ciated with biotechnology, the complexity of strategic manage-
ment rules and the then unusually high amount of needed funds.
First of all, the necessary monetary tools are available only at
the largest companies. Second, the necessary competencies are
often missing with smaller companies. For example, a smaller
company, a market leader in R&D, does not have the necessary
experience either of the capability needed to clinical testing or
production. Cooperation is necessary to fill these gaps. With
this sharing of different sorts of risks will be realised. These
risks, actually non-calculable uncertainties several times, may
be technology, market, regulatory or competition related. The
later reflects on the segments of all the other risks, since the
rapid development of China, South Korea and India. The only
advantages can only be quality and knowledge for the traditional
pharma producing countries. But precisely these are areas where
China and India are developing rapidly, while maintaining the
seemingly natural price advantage. Europe and the USA can
only compete with these products if they do not count on price
advantage, but on therapeutic advantage. This means producing
a newer, better molecule, first of all. However this larger added
intellectual value brings larger risks on behalf of technological,
market and registration. These tendencies are also catalysts of
cooperation.
It is precisely these different, yet interrelated risks that make
pharmaceutical biotechnology complex. To successfully man-
age complex processes and instability necessitates coopera-
tion. Instabilities are cross-linked, they can even strengthen or
weaken each other. An example of mutual strengthening is the
technological uncertainty of producing a new molecule, and the
registration and legalization which follow. Registration gives the
same molecule an added economical value and can, if it is reg-
istered already, decrease market instability, since it can become
a market leader, a so called “blockbuster”1, with multi million
dollar yearly turnover.
Thus instabilities constitute a kind of synergic system. In-
stabilities are difficult to predict individually, their interrelations
are even more so.
Necessity of cooperation can be explained from another point
of view as well (Fig. 3). Validity period of a patent is 20 years
from the date of application, which, in case of pharmaceuticals
can be extended by at most 5 years (SPC). According to Fig. 3,
the product generally appears on the market 13-15 years after
the patent application. With the end of the patent period, one
must also count with the appearance of generic and biosimilar
products.2 Thus there is, at most 10, but more often only 5 years
to cover the entire costs of R&D and clinical costs and make
some revenue. Thus everyone seeks to make the time needed
for R&D as short as possible. One method could be some sort
of open innovation, which supports cooperation and outsourc-
1 A blockbuster drug is a drug generating more than $1 billion of revenue for
its owner each year.
2 A generic drug (generic drugs, short: generics) is a drug which is produced
and distributed without patent protection. The generic drug may still have a
patent on the formulation but not on the active ingredient.
Biosimilars or follow-on biologics are terms used to describe officially ap-
proved new versions of innovator biopharmaceutical products, following patent
expiry.
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Fig. 3. A typical time-schedule of a new biotech identity
ing instead of solving everything in-house. There are numerous
factors which make a part of the R&D earlier fully integrated in
the vertical control target of outsourcing. To shorten the needed
time to find a molecule and make it a drug, the steeply growing
costs of keeping all the needed expertise within the firm, the de-
creasing costs of reaching the needed expertise outside, together
the transaction costs arguments and the abundance of expertise
outside are all for giving advantage to trust R&D tasks to out-
siders who are already experts in the given field. This method
definitely saves time and possibly costs as well and systemat-
ically open access to better solutions than those available in a
“closed innovation” method.
Naturally, in this case, different interests collide. The interest
of the originator company as they are called in the pharma indus-
try is to hold on its monopole status as long as possible. This is
exactly opposite to the interests of the generic companies, who
would like to appear on the market as soon as possible. Con-
sumers are located between the two parties, thus favouring an in-
termediate approach. They profit from the appearance of generic
pharmaceuticals in two ways. Their appearance leads to a de-
crease in prices, while at the same time, the original companies
have to develop new pharmaceuticals, which will be protected
from the generic companies for a while. A too short patent pe-
riod is not good for the consumers, as in this case it will not be
profitable for originator companies to produce new pharmaceu-
ticals, or the testing period will not be long, thorough enough,
leading to potential hazards.
2.3 On risks and uncertainties
The assessment of risks (uncertainties) in the technological
development is becoming an increasingly difficult task to solve.
This is especially true in a rapidly changing turbulent environ-
ment, where environment and its knowledge changes from day
to day, where in addition to small ones, radical innovations are
typical as well. Understanding the necessary parameters is be-
coming more and more uncertain, thus also becoming limited.
There is a huge literature on technological uncertainty just as
there is on risks of financial issues.
My main problem with this is that there is a strong incli-
nation to believe that uncertainty can always be successfully
modelled by quantitative risk assessment (qRA). In contrast to
this, a wide range of environmental studies puts emphasis on the
non-predictable risk. (Think of the management consequence of
non-predictability, the needed precaution.)3 According to Stir-
ling’s model (Fig. 4) we can generate four main groups of uncer-
tainties [8] when taking into account the diminishing knowledge
of both the occurrence of events and their frequency. In a more
refined system we would have got to differentiate between the
events that cause risks and the damages caused by them. This
would add two more parameters to the system of uncertainty.
(We may not know what can occur as a causing factor AND we
may not know what its effect in some environments may be.)
But for demonstration of the difference between calculable and
non-calculable risk (uncertainty) it is enough to look at a sim-
3 I use the considerations I. Hronszky and –L. Várkonyi in Harvard Business
Review [9] referring to Stirling [10].
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plified system.
Uncertainty can be interpreted in the following two dimen-
sional systems:
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Fig. 4. [8]: Two dimensions of uncertainty
Breakthrough, radical innovations are created under circum-
stances which lead to genuine surprise. They necessarily im-
ply essential previous ignorance, and result in genuine surprise.
To different extents, this is the definition of radical innovations.
That is the reason why managing radical innovation, the uncer-
tainty and the unknown, the sphere of ignorance, has a conse-
quence. That is that some sort of trial and error approach, is a
key issue. With this we acquire some plausible knowledge about
a part of the “previously unknowable” while taking certain inter-
relations into account. It can be stated that during the evaluation
of an uncertain situation partly the “I know that I know” prob-
lems should be handled. In this case a deterministic, at least a
probability based answer can be provided for. Other problems
are of an “I know that I don’t know” nature (I know the phe-
nomenon but I don’t know the possibility of the occurrence). In
this case we can provide plausible answers. The third type is
the “I don’t know that I don’t know” problem, meaning igno-
rance, already a challenge that both even events and effects are
unknown. These are extreme situations e.g. when extreme secu-
rity requirements are to be realised or outstandingly high profit
is searched for. In permanently turbulent environments these
questions become the natural questions [9].
Two types of problems emerge in very uncertain situations.
First, we literally do not know what can happen (for example by
the synergistic effects of known factors and what can the effect
be) and second, we do not know the frequency of what happens
either. It is most important to see that the main problem with
these types of issues is not the calculability with prognostic aim.
The problem is the lack of knowledge what can occur at all, the
so called lack of ability of modelling.
In terms of biotechnology, uncertainty in the progressing re-
alization of some innovation can be understood more as “igno-
rance”, or “real surprise” for a while. With the accelerating de-
velopment of biotech industry the domain of “we don’t know
what we don’t know”, the range of insufficiently known events
and distributions, ‘original surprises’ is becoming increasingly
important, in most cases also accented by irreversibility [9]4.
Fuzzy sets considerations can only be part of the solution for
these types of issues. At their border “ignorance” is impossible
not to take into account if there are reasons that the turbulence
is very high.
The lack of the possibility to make reliable risk calculations
poses a problem. For example, when looking at the produc-
tion of pharmaceuticals through genetically modified organ-
isms, producers were faced by problems such of the societal
acceptance of the questionable health and environmental conse-
quences of the technology. These concerns resulted in an over-
all judgment of all technology using recombinant organisms, re-
gardless of their isolation during use. At the same time, “classic”
events influencing pharmaceutical production still play a role,
such as the merging and cooperation of concurrent companies in
the background, as well as the state of industrial rights protec-
tion. A new and non-foreseeable problem is the appearance of
biogeneric / biosimilar molecules, which generate further uncer-
tainty in the fields of regulation and registration (n-th dimension
uncertainty).
Another problem is also possed by uncertainties. In some
areas (ex. industrial rights protection, technical realization) cer-
tainties are easier to calculate, whereas in others (ex. changes
in controls, marketability, price, demand, supply) they are very
difficult to approximate. The later are areas which cannot be
generalized based on classical examples from the pharmaceuti-
cal or chemical industries, they are biotech-specific. Thus there
are uncertainties which are unknown. The most difficult task
is to incorporate unknown processes when making a decision.
Based on this information, when looking at the figure, we can
talk about lack of knowledge and real surprises concerning a
radical biotechnological innovation.
Based on this we can ascertain that in case of the drastic re-
duction of knowledge, sooner or later we can begin talking about
lack of knowledge instead of uncertainty, since we do not have,
in certain cases, we cannot have any information regarding the
events to come, not just the frequency of their occurence [11].
Dealing with the role of uncertainty for decision making it is
too much told about the risk facts, the analytical level. But deci-
sion making unavoidably includes risk evaluation too. It is un-
fortunate that the risk assessment literature neglects this layer.
Following Schwartz and Thompson, and utilizing ideas from
lectures of Imre Hronszky and the PhD Dissertation of Ágnes
4 Irreversibility means that two or more surprisingly emerging processes may
get into synergistic interrelations that together may make practically impossible
the going back to the starting line once again.
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Fésüs I shortly demonstrate what with risk evaluation the issue
is. Actually at risk evaluation for basic types of evaluating per-
spectives can be utilized. The Fig. 5 below demonstrates them.
Types of nature represented by different potential curves ac-
cepted by the four different types of agents in society, according
to Schwarz and Thompson:
Nature capricious
Nature benign
Nature perverse/
tolerant
Nature ephemer
Fig. 5. Four different types of agents in society, by Schwarz and Thompson
based on [12]
This means that a real decision is influenced both by factual
assessment of risks and evaluation of them, beside genuine man-
agement and communication considerations.
2.4 The results of uncertainty
According to Fig. 4, when trying to manage the areas of “ig-
norance” and “real surprise” large and small biotech companies
undergo a sort of evolutionary change. Not all large companies
undertook the task of looking for and using the newest discover-
ies in biotechnology with their own resources. They deem these
projects too risky, or a large and well situated company may
not be motivated enough to jeopardize its comfortable status.
Smaller companies, spin-off enterprises and biotech organiza-
tions on the other hand are forced to develop and use the new,
and thus risky technology, since this is their only way of com-
peting with large companies.
Recently, biotech companies entered the early phases of re-
search, selling their products, ideas and results to pharmaceuti-
cal producers [13]. These companies were small. Therefore they
could not even think about producing their own product. Sell-
ing their knowledge was something they could realize. Many of
them went bankrupt, were not successful, but there were those
that survived this early phase [14].
Large pharmaceutical companies usually purchase finished
molecules, before or after the 2nd clinical phase5 from the small
5Phase I trials are the first stage of testing in human subjects. Normally, a
small group of healthy volunteers will be selected. This phase includes trials
designed to assess the safety, tolerability, pharmacokinetics, and pharmacody-
namics of a drug.
Once the initial safety of the study drug has been confirmed in Phase I trials,
Phase II trials are performed on larger groups, and are designed to assess how
well the drug works, as well as to continue Phase I safety assessments in a larger
group of volunteers and patients.
biotech companies. This means that with the technological de-
velopment is already some win-win situation realized this way.
Big companies reduce their risks, which however still remained
considerable, even in this phase, but at the same time the coop-
eration with the smalls allow small biotech companies to pros-
per. New forms, new players were formed. CMO units (con-
tracted place of production) for example, CRO organizations
(contracted research unit), consulting and service companies. In
other words the organizations share the risk, the same way they
share the work and the income.
Small
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Fig. 6. The risk sharing process, based on [9] (modified by the author)
Fig. 6 shows the risk sharing process. By their nature, com-
pletely new biotechnological projects, aiming at radical innova-
tion, originally fall into the “suicide box”. They are character-
ized by high market and technological uncertainty. In a given
situation, a small biotech company, since it has no other choice,
working out the right technology, sells it to the larger pharma-
ceutical company. From the point of view of the big company,
the technological uncertainty is reduced considerably, since it
is purchasing a technology that has been proven to work. (The
technology is over the proof of the concept phase). The mar-
ket uncertainty remains now to solve, which can be assessed
and estimated by the purchaser. Another extreme case is when
a small innovative company tries to become a supplier for one
of the large market players. Trying to meet its needs, perhaps
even relocating closer to the purchaser, is thus reducing market
uncertainty for both parties. Thus the reason for cooperation is
to decrease at least one, but preferably both (marked by dashed
Phase III studies are randomized controlled multicenter trials on large patient
groups and are aimed at being the definitive assessment of how effective the drug
is, in comparison with current ’gold standard’ treatment.
Phase IV trial is also known as Post Marketing Surveillance Trial. Phase IV
trials involve the safety surveillance (pharmacovigilance) and ongoing technical
support of a drug after it receives permission to be sold.
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arrow) uncertainties. By sharing the associated risks, the orga-
nizations will not be able to reach the small innovation level,
as this is not the goal of the cooperation. But at least they can
decrease risk somewhat.
Large companies (at first in Japan, then in the USA) decreased
their in-house activities by focusing more on outsourcing, thus
becoming faster and viable. The role of innovation has in-
creased, it has become the main weapon of small knowledge ori-
ented organizations that are closely linked to universities. This
way of organizing innovation made it necessary for large com-
panies to change their strategies, becoming faster and rethink-
ing their risk assessment. When looking at the pharmaceutical
industry, large companies are becoming more and more depen-
dent on the original discoverer of the pharmaceutical molecule,
on the small biotech companies. But this changed relationship
is beneficial for both parties. Cooperation with a large pharma-
ceutical company guarantees company’s growth and long life.
Cooperation is also supported by the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer, since the fastest and least risky method of acquiring in-
novation and holding onto strategic advantages is building from
the outside [15].
3 Strategies of biotech companies
3.1 The issue of R&D structure
The organisational structure, or “anatomy” of the biotechno-
logical R&D sector is a key issue. The anatomy is composed
of the sector’s direct participants (spin-off companies, other en-
terprises, R&D laboratories, universities, pharmaceutical com-
panies) and the institutions that connect them (capital markets,
intellectual property protection). For the complete success of
biotechnology, anatomy is bound to further the participants to
excellent performances in three fields:
• risk taking, risk management and risk rewarding,
• integrating and rapidly mastering knowledge and abilities that
reside in different disciples and functions,
• improving knowledge of critical importance on both struc-
tural and industrial levels.
The industrial structure (anatomy) is supposed to be consistent,
its parts are supposed to help and support each other, they are
supposed to meet challenges.
In biotechnology aims seem to contradict each other. For in-
stance, industry finances business (evaluates risk), which con-
tradicts the laborious R&D work needed for the development
of new pharmaceuticals. The diversification of the industry and
the small, but largely specified mass of participants involve the
formation of islands of specialized knowledge, which prevent
knowledge integration. Furthermore, intellectual property mar-
ket, where companies can provide right to use scientific achieve-
ments, limits the number of researchers who can improve this
knowledge by learning from experiments and failures.
Before biotechnology appeared, science and industry had not
or to a much less extent been mixed in the classical pharmaceu-
tical industry. Experiments conducted in order to extend scien-
tific knowledge had belonged to universities, state laboratories,
nonprofit research centres. Only a few big companies carried
out cutting-edge research, but these were unique ones. Biotech-
nology connected the two fields and created a new scientific-
business model. Universities’ and biotech companies’ borders
merged. Many companies are founded at universities (spin-off),
employees belong to both of them and they often share their
means too.
Genentec worked out a model for making money of intel-
lectual property in biotechnology, which greatly affected the
present operation of biotechnology, and proved its viability in
the practice. The model contains three interacting elements [16]:
• technology transfer from universities to the private sphere,
through establishing new companies instead of marketing to
existing companies
• risk capital and share markets, which provide financing in
critical times and reward risktakers
• expert market, where new companies give intellectual prop-
erty to old companies in return for financing.
The anatomy of biotechnology is not optimal at present. It is
like other high-tech sectors, such as IT. It involves new ventures
with university background, which focus on certain elements of
the R&D value chain. Furthermore, anatomy consists of capital
and share markets.
This structure is based on the approach that biotech will be
like other innovative, high-tech industries. In fact, three major
differences are present:
• great and permanent uncertainty, which can be traced back to
the unknown nature and n-th dimensional uncertainty of sys-
tems and processes, risking e.g. pharmaceutical development
to a great extent.
• The R&D elements of a pharmaceutical (links of the value
chain) cannot be separated from each other, involved disci-
plines and organisations have to cooperate very closely.
• The knowledge of companies in the pharma-biotech sector
is mainly intuitive or tacit, which makes the exploitation of
collective knowledge and cooperation difficult.
As a consequence of the above mentioned, a better anatomy ex-
ists, or at least may theoretically exist, which has to be or should
be followed by companies of the sector in order to optimally ex-
ploit collective knowledge. In general it can be said that in the
extremely risky and innovative, yet outstandingly high risk-high
benefit biotechnology methods and anatomy have to be different
from the also innovative IT tools and construction.
The vertical nature of integration should be enhanced. This
requires a critical size, thus the big pharma companies have to
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be the integrators. This means that the inner structures have to be
changed. Cooperations are still of great importance, but closer,
more strategic cooperations are necessary. I tried to demon-
strate already earlier in theis article that it is clear that even
the biggest companies cannot manage their entire R&D alone,
division, strategic division of labour is needed. Strategic divi-
sions of labour (e.g., carrying out basic research focusing on one
costumer) are more efficient than some occasional cooperation.
These cooperations are generally long-term ones.
This strategic approach characterises biotechnology compa-
nies as well. Still a lot of small spin-off companies are needed,
because they are the first essential institutional element of the
innovation chain. It is rather the big, independent, non-project
companies, the number of which may be decreased with further
evolution of the learning of the good strategies for biotech com-
panies research activities.
Research can less and less be divided into disciplines. It is
more of a comprehensive nature, because biotechnological inno-
vations may not only have biotech and medical, but also mathe-
matical, chemical, physical and IT aspects. As a result, the role
of interdisciplinary projects is increasing.
Consequently, cooperations have to be laid on new founda-
tions, they have to be stabilized and made dynamic at the same
time [16].6
3.2 A possible survival strategy for biotech companies:
“protected market companies”
A biotech company must gain some sort of strategic advan-
tage on the competition. This can be accomplished in two ways:
the realisation of the product/service can either be less expen-
sive by cooperation than by competition or leads to better prod-
uct/service. A special form of the later is when a product does
not have a direct competitor. Naturally, a smaller biotech com-
pany can break into some smaller market segment. This is how
so called “niche-companies” are formed. In addition to cooper-
ation, this is one of the survival strategies of beginning biotech
companies.
What exactly does a protected area (niche) mean? It can be
described as a protected region, a new market opening or a pro-
tected segment. Of course there can be a market “gap” as well,
a segment where competition is not active. In my opinion this
can also be a technological gap, or segment.
From the point of view of the market, a niche market is a well
defined smaller segment of a larger market. To say well defined,
is important, since this is what the company will be “labelled”
by. A single focus guarantees efficiency. Knowledge, informa-
tion and innovations will not branch out, thus guaranteeing ef-
ficient operation. The small size of the segment also provides
protection, it is important to choose an appropriately tight seg-
ment. It must be large enough for the company to survive and
6I rely in this chaper on the considerations of Pisano (Can Science Be a
Business?), Harvard Business Manager, October 2006.,114-122 heavily.
grow according to plan, but too small, non economical for large
companies to enter. A possible “exit” strategy for biotech com-
panies is demonstrating that the given segment is not as small
as it was previously thought, thus gaining the interest of large
companies. Of course, the right IP strategy and technology is
needed for this sort of success.
At the same time it is important to assess whether the market
gap is large enough. What is the size of the market that will
purchase our product or services?
At the same time, the company must possess very specific
knowledge in these specific markets. This may mean actual
knowledge, or skills, which include the necessary equipment,
tools and contacts. These may be very difficult to reach, requir-
ing problem solving skills and further development. Due to the
small size of the market, these may require specialized solutions,
acquiring these can be more costly, in some cases many times
more costly than generalized solutions. This must be assessed
when mapping the market. Furthermore it means an exceptional
learning skill is required related to a small focused field.
In my opinion the protected niche technology can only be de-
fined along with the niche market, as they are always closely
linked. In practice it refers to technology, tools, molecules or
solutions developed for a specific market segment. This guaran-
tees its novelty and individuality. It is important to reach critical
mass. Will the company be able to reach a large enough percent-
age of the protected market? It is also a potential advantage if
the solution can be expanded into broader markets. At this point
I would like to emphasize industrial rights protection.
Companies associated with specialized, protected markets or
technology, have their advantages (+) and disadvantages (−):
+ defined goal, concentration of resources
+ new, unique technology, service, knowledge
+ a smaller company is able to reach critical market mass
+ in case of the right market, an exceptionally valuable product
can be produced
+ close ties form with other players of the small market
+ a market that is relatively protected from competition
− small market, or in some cases, no market at all, since the
given company generates its own market, (the marketing of
innovation)
− it is difficult to find the right market and consumers
− a possible lack of sales channels, perhaps the critical mass is
not met
− the company may be very sensitive to changes in the given
niche.
Survival is possible if the niche company can become the
market leader (in the given market). At this point it can even
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compete with a multi billion dollar pharmaceutical company,
since the targeted market is different, the amount of profit is not
enough to motivate a large company. A large company will con-
centrate on areas where it can best use the advantages of its size
and economic power. Generating and defining a market gap,
then developing into it, most likely represent a larger risk, than
operating in existing markets.
A small niche company is dependent on different partners,
due to the nature of the gap. Very often these developments
do not have any precursors, so they require completely, or par-
tially new technology, which is often too complex for a small
company. A small company needs grants, tenders and other out-
side support. Collaborations, consortiums and clusters all help
in acquiring this support. Collaboration makes research less ex-
pensive, thus critical mass is easier to reach.
3.3 On the evolution of the collaboration between biotech-
nological and pharmaceutical companies
Just as in all other newly emerging industries the presence
of small specialized companies, profiting from cooperation and
clusters is significant. From this point of view, biotechnology is
similar to telecommunication, information technology and the
media. The large pharmaceutical company controls the finances
of cooperation, even though it only takes part in the real work
after Phase 2, or Phase 3. This way the large company becomes
dependent on the small companies who provide the technology
and knowledge, since it builds on them, investing into markets
and production potential. It is more economical for it to spend
a portion of the budget on supporting smaller companies and
cooperation, than to finance broad R&D. Biotechnological co-
operation is characterized by the inequality of power amongst
the participants.
Biotech companies often sub-contract production, marketing
and sales to a large pharmaceutical company. When they do
this, they have already reached a certain minimum result or size,
which means a risk reduction for large pharmaceutical compa-
nies.
The reason for merging is important changes in the
knowledge-generation, which has a very dynamic effect on this
industry and its specific institutions. Evolution can be described
by a two step process. Due to specific knowledge and through
scientific research centres biotech and pharmaceutical compa-
nies are linked very closely, closer than other branches of indus-
try.
The change from old to new biotechnology came about thanks
to financial investors, who were convinced in the success of new
university spin-off enterprises. Many favourable forecasts were
made based on the prevention of infectious diseases, extrapo-
lated to genetic illnesses. Many large companies and investors
sought to cease this opportunity, thus start-up companies were
the center of attention. Expectations were confirmed by the hu-
man insulin project (Genetech, 1979).
The first successful companies changed the type of growth of
the industry, just as they changed the vision of business. Despite
their successes, these companies had their weaknesses. They
were headed by university, academic personnel, who did not
identify the issue first of all as business but as an invention pro-
cess. Investors changed this, putting the overall conceptualisa-
tion in the hands of businessmen, and leaving the scientist re-
sponsible for the technology, only. As a result many of these
companies made it then to the stock market. Companies without
financial investors crumbled and went bankrupt. Thus investors
functioned as a sort of selection pressure.
The second wave of growth occurred at the end of the 1990s,
when economic potentials were ready for the introduction of
new research, the focus was placed on the analytical under-
standing of work with living organisms. The knowledge of
sequencing of genomes (ex. human genome project) greatly
and emblematically influences the further areas of development
in biotechnological and pharmaceutical research. This sec-
ond wave was interdisciplinary to a large extent, combining
the knowledge from different, complementary fields (chemistry,
biotechnology, material studies, mechanics and computing).
These interdisciplinary studies between organizations brought
about new industrial activities and cooperation. Small biotech
companies played a different role, becoming discoverers and in-
troducers of new techniques, generating input for large phar-
maceutical companies [17]. Thus cooperation between a small
biotech company and a large pharmaceutical company resulted
in a competitive advantage in the already very competitive phar-
maceutical industry. Many small companies remained cooperat-
ing outside units, where as others merged into the large compa-
nies.
I refer from the literature to Garnier (Rebuilding the R&D
engine in Big Pharma) [18]. In the case of GlaxoSmithKlein,
the management realised in the late 1990s that their organisa-
tional pyramid had become obsolete. Until then, in accordance
with the principle of closed innovation, we can say exaggerat-
edly that they had been just a great R&D unit with general scope
of duties. They aimed at establishing more specific units, del-
egating competencies, making R&D processes faster and more
flexible. As a consequence, they divided the former units into
smaller R&D units with different focuses, which allowed group
leaders more freedom and a really relevant knowledge [18].
Knowledge plays an increasingly important role in survival.
Naturally large companies use the knowledge of their partners
as well. Due to cooperation, some large company - small com-
pany alliances managed to survive, marketing new molecules
and breaking into new areas of technology. Large companies
are at an organizational advantage, they have broader market
contacts, they are better off financially, they can realize larger
outside investments and they have more experience. These are
all factors, which smaller companies cannot reach on their own.
The advantages of smaller companies are: faster adaptation to
a changing environment, more willingness to undertake new
projects, increased personal attention to detail, more personal
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contact with customers.
These days the visible tendency is for certain biotechnology
companies to establish long lasting strategic cooperation with a
certain pharmaceutical company. Thus the biotech company de-
velops its portfolio, its importers so that its products will meet
the requirements of the large company comprising its market.
In some cases the topics and ideas come from the pharmaceu-
tical company. Thus the importers of knowledge are becoming
increasingly more specialized. Naturally these interrelations do
not mean exclusivity. New companies and results are emerging
all the time, new interactions can occur alongside these interre-
lations.
This is a knowledge intensive sector. New procedures, dis-
coveries and procedures appear, the knowledge needed to sur-
vive changes rapidly. The R&D costs needed for acquiring the
necessary knowledge are high, however if companies do not fol-
low the changes in technology, they have no chance of long term
profit.
What does this mean? The largest biotechnology companies
can invest lots of resources in R&D and reap its benefits. There
are several of these companies in the USA, a few in Europe and
very few ( if any. . . ) in Hungary.
Thus reaching critical mass is out of question. Thus it is nec-
essary to develop some sort of interaction (network) between
companies which is a sort of “division of labour”.
During the fight for survival and growth, formal and informal
cooperation, strategic and interest alliances are formed. A com-
pany’s success in biotechnology requires three different compe-
tencies: strong management, financial resources, good technol-
ogy. Strong management is the most important factor, since it
will be the one who will be able to acquire money and oversee
research directives. However suitable resources and technology
alone is not enough for success, since in biotechnology strate-
gies the novelty of the product is more important than its price
advantage. Technology requires a considerable investment, well
before it can generate any revenue.
4 Summary
As we have seen in biotechnology, just as in other rapidly
evolving branches of industry, changes are very fast, the in-
crease of knowledge is exponential. Since this industry is of
very high risk (“high risk – high benefit”), and these risks are
in great measure non-calculable uncertainties, and since R&D
phases may require several hundred million dollars, the partic-
ipants seek to minimize and share risks. Small biotech compa-
nies can follow two strategies for staying alive: finding a pro-
tected market segment where, with the help of outside resources
they can become definitive, or by concentrating on cooperation,
taking on smaller tasks, becoming an importer of knowledge as
a member of a cluster. These special solutions, as I have shown,
work in biotechnology.
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